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Incumbent national leaders invite foreign election monitors only when it is in their interest to do so. Rarely is 
significant financial assistance "conditional" on holding elections, although it does improve a regime's image 
abroad to do so. For governments being observed, the trick is to orchestrate the process enough to win, but not 
enough to arouse observers' suspicions. 
Stereotypes 
of inherent Arab and Islamic antipathy 
to political liberalism notwithstanding, Western 
agencies have spent millions of dollars and thou? 
sands of staff-days "democratizing" Middle Eastern coun? 
tries over the past decade. Elections experts and 
observers employ a distinctive methodology that frames 
national politics in terms of observable universal crite? 
ria. A complex multinational bureaucracy dispatches 
missions to undertake projects that are part translation, 
part documentary?projects with a distinctive scenario, 
plot and denouement. In the Arab world, as in Central 
America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, such projects 
tend to be self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating. The ar? 
rival of consultants and monitors raises, but rarely ful? 
fills, the democratic aspirations of voters, grassroots 
activists and opposition candidates. 
Sheila Carapico, chair of the editorial committee of this magazine, is chair of 
the political science department a  the University ofRichmond. Her most recent 
book is Civil Society in Yemen: A Political Economy of Activism in Modern 
Arabia (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Donors and Democracy Experts 
Elections experts, like other development professionals, 
join expeditionary teams called "missions," e.g., a mis? 
sion to draft an elections law or to observe voting proce? 
dures. Missions also have "a mission": to improve the 
technical aspects of polling or to help ensure that the 
outcome is "free and fair." 
Elections projects are distinguished from traditional 
foreign aid primarily by a tight time-table in the months, 
weeks and days leading up to balloting. Compared with 
ongoing economic development assistance and multi-year 
institution-building projects for state bureaucracies, elec? 
tions-related missions are uniquely episodic. Technical 
assistance for elections dispatches foreign experts to capi? 
tal cities for six months or so before the elections, then 
flies in monitoring teams for a week or a fortnight of 
advice or training. Known as "short-term observer mis? 
sions" inside the industry and "elections tourism" by de- 
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tractors, monitoring delegations are dispatched on short 
notice for the finite purpose of observing practices in a 
sample of precincts while votes are cast and counted. 
International observation of Arab elections is a recent 
innovation, associated with several trends in the post- 
Cold War "third wave of democracy." No sooner had the 
Berlin Wall fallen than elections consultants headed for 
Central Europe to facilitate an enthusiastically antici? 
pated transition to political and economic liberalism. At 
the same time, exposes of past aid-enriched dictators like 
Marcos, Duvallier, Mobuto and Suharto led to policy re? 
forms within donor agencies and the emergence of First 
World constituencies for the protection of human rights, 
women's rights, environments and other worthy causes 
in the Third World. By the mid-1990s, World Bank eco? 
nomic policy-makers had decided that democratic insti? 
tutions foster sustainable growth, and elections moved 
to the forefront of major powers' foreign policy agendas.1 
In its early days the United Nations pioneered elec? 
tions-monitoring under its mandate to assist new nations, 
African trust territories on the road to independence and 
nations recovering from civil war?criteria recently evi? 
dent in Palestinian autonomous areas, post-civil war 
Lebanon, newly united and post-civil war Yemen, newly 
independent Eritrea and member nations of the Com? 
monwealth of Independent States. Under exceptional 
circumstances, most recently Bosnia and Cambodia, the 
Security Council directs the UN/Electoral Assistance 
Division (UNEAD) to supervise or organize elections. The 
Arab League and the Organization of African Unity may 
also send observers on behalf of member states. Prior to 
the late 1980s, however, bilateral monitoring of elections 
was something of a taboo. Only during the past decade 
has there been "a modification of the concept of inter? 
vention" such that poll-watching and related technical 
assistance are not necessarily considered to infringe upon 
national sovereignty.2 
Currently a wide array of transnational institutions 
is directly or indirectly involved in engineering or moni? 
toring elections. Under the Maastricht Common Foreign 
and Security Policy's mandate for electoral assistance and 
observation, the European Union's Election Unit (EUEU) 
devoted hundreds of expert-months to preparation and 
observation of the historic Palestinian and South Afri? 
can elections.3 Like its counterparts in Canada, the Neth? 
erlands and Germany, the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) pursues "good governance" and 
"civil and political rights" through a range of projects 
promoting parliamentary, judicial and civil society insti? 
tution-building,4 while the separately-funded National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) provides grants to the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Interna? 
tional Republican Institute (IRI) for transnational 
projects.5 Five German party-affiliated stiftungen (insti? 
tutes), most prominently those associated with the Chris? 
tian Democrats and the Social Democrats, send missions 
to strengthen or observe the conduct of elections, as do 
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semi-autonomous Canadian, Dutch and French founda? 
tions. While a few, such as the Carter Center or the Soros 
Foundation, are privately financed, other groups, such 
as the US-UK group International Foundation for Elec? 
toral Systems (IFES) or Elections Canada, implement 
programs under contracts with aid agencies. 
Perhaps contrary to the perceptions of many Ameri? 
cans, election monitoring is not simply an exercise in 
American influence but a multilateral, multifaceted un? 
dertaking.6 American aid, decoupled from poverty, sup? 
ports security policy with massive transfers to Israel, a 
huge mission in Egypt and significant programs in Jor? 
dan, Palestinian communities and the new CIS repub? 
lics, while maintaining a low profile elsewhere in the 
region. USAID missions in Tunisia, Yemen, Oman and 
Pakistan have been terminated, while Morocco and Leba? 
non receive only token US aid. Thus, despite America's 
highly visible military posture in the region, most needy 
countries rely more upon European or multilateral as? 
sistance than upon US economic loans and grants. More? 
over, US allies and even American NGOs often try to 
distance themselves from US military actions against 
Arab targets. By the same token, elections provide occa? 
sions for a special, short-term, technically unofficial 
American display of expertise and interest in those coun? 
tries that do not enjoy US foreign assistance. Rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the Clinton Administration's democracy 
promotion efforts are essentially realpolitik.7 
Selective Democratization 
In the Near and Middle East, foreigners monitor elec? 
tions in low- or medium-income countries seeking pri? 
vate commercial bank loans and direct investments as 
well as public concessional credits, direct grants and tech? 
nical assistance. The governments of Jordan, Morocco, 
Algeria, Yemen, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, 
Lebanon, Kazakhastan and Azerbaijan hope well-publi? 
cized elections will win them favor with Western donors 
and creditors. 
In contrast, pariah regimes and Western allies alike 
reject elections monitoring as a violation of their national 
sovereignty. Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan and Afghani? 
stan unanimously vilify Western democratic rhetoric as 
nothing more than neo-imperialism and castigate moni? 
tors as espionage agents. 
Friends and allies of the US are also sensitive to po? 
litical meddling. No monitors oversee elections in Tur? 
key, the region's only NATO member, nor in Israel, the 
region's only stable parliamentary democracy. Israel, 
which, despite its high standard of living remains the 
largest recipient of US aid in the world (and a benefi? 
ciary of much private charity), takes cash rather than 
technical assistance: it does not have a USAID mission 
offering American expertise. Even in Egypt, where sub? 
stantial American and European aid packages include 
funds for parliamentary libraries, liberal think tanks and 
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the like, the regime has not permitted outsiders to 
inspect its electoral processes. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, 
too rich to qualify for US, UN, World Bank or European 
economic assistance, control even local journalistic 
reporting as tightly as any of the region's states, and 
regard democracy as a Western construct alien to their 
cultural and religious heritage. Only Kuwait, with great 
fanfare orchestrated by Washington public relations 
firms, welcomed international observers to its post-Gulf 
War parliamentary elections, then demonstrated further 
appreciation for liberal politics with a $50,000 donation 
to the Congressional Human Rights Foundation.8 The 
International Republican Institute was permitted to 
write a study of Oman's legislature, but was careful not 
to call for elections,9 while Bahraini intellectuals' pleas 
for international support of their pro-democracy 
movement have fallen on deaf ears. 
The Election-Day Theatrical Display 
Journalists, scholars and professionals from across the 
political spectrum have critically scrutinized elections- 
related activities of donors and semi-autonomous foun? 
dations in the Americas and Europe. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean, US aid programs built up national 
security apparatuses10 and encouraged what have been 
called "demonstration elections," often funding right-wing 
candidates. Until the constitutional court outlawed the 
practice in the 1990s, the German Federal Republic's 
stiftungen coached and bankrolled selected foreign 
parties.11 Western powers hand-picked non-Communist 
parties, candidates and organizations in Russia,12 Czecho? 
slovakia and Hungary,13 and orchestrated and validated 
fraudulent Bosnian elections.14 After just a couple of 
years, Poles dubbed Warsaw's "reform consultants" the 
"Marriott Brigades."15 Throughout the former Commu? 
nist countries, the initial hopes that consultants from 
Western democracies would impart valuable secrets of 
liberal governance have now soured, leaving in their wake 
a far more cynical view of monitoring processes choreo? 
graphed carefully for "representatives of the international 
community." 
These experiences have been repeated in the Arab 
world. Elections are preceded by a stream of project de? 
signers, evaluators, consultants and observers who ar? 
rive soon after elections are announced in order to survey, 
advise and train local officials and participants. Antici? 
pating the landmark 1996 legislative elections in the West 
Bank and Gaza,16 the EUEU, NDI, IRI, IFES, Arab- 
American groups, the Carter Center and other North 
American and European institutions dispatched missions 
or established offices in an extraordinary commission? 
ing of studies, training programs and technical assistance 
on matters such as constituency-drawing, voter registra? 
tion, polling security and vote-counting. 
A week or so before polling day, all the hotels in places 
like Rabat, Sana'a or Almaty are booked solid with moni? 
tors and observers from around the world. It costs a lot 
of money to field a small team of experts or a large ob? 
server delegation, especially if they fly from the US: sala? 
ries, airfare, translators, set-up expenses for assessment 
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and monitoring put the international price-tag of elec? 
tions for the Palestinian, Yemeni and Jordanian parlia? 
ments in the range of several dollars per voter. 
Incumbent national leaders invite foreign monitors 
only when it is in their interest to do so. Rarely is signifi? 
cant financial assistance "conditional" on holding elec? 
tions, although it does improve a regime's image abroad 
to do so. Even though the net transfer of cash and goods 
is minimal and the hosting of experts can impose hidden 
costs, funds-hungry regimes in poor countries anticipate 
material or political rewards. Seminars, junkets and 
honoraria for local officials, NGO activists, intellectuals 
and loyal-opposition figures help "sell" them on the elec? 
toral process. Beyond the electoral arena where parties 
compete for domestic constituencies, they vie for inter? 
national patronage, political as well as financial.17 
Under these circumstances, electoral festivities are 
choreographed by and for visiting dignitaries. Mission 
leaders and delegates meet with "everyone who's any? 
one." Reporting stations in big hotels or convention cen? 
ters distribute materials in English, while citizens await 
the ballot results via international satellite television. 
National broadcasters feature or contrive the "stamp of 
approval" of delegations from America and Europe. In 
one such instance, after Yemen's 1993 parliamentary elec? 
tions, the NDI complained to the Supreme Elections Com? 
mittee (SEC) that its objections to ruling party 
manipulation of a local elections monitoring committee 
sponsored by NDI "were inaccurately portrayed on tele? 
vision as emphatic NDI endorsements of the SEC and 
its success in establishing fool-proof mechanisms for free 
and fair elections."18 
Some monitors have suspected that what they wit? 
nessed was detached from political reality. One wrote that 
"legions [of] private contractors who claim expertise in 
the 'building of democracy'" descended on Kyrgyzstan 
prior to its elections in early 1993. They "took up resi? 
dence in the former communist party hotels and created 
an artificial community of contractors" isolated from lo? 
cal society. "The substantive democracy aid itself," he 
concluded, "was so abstract, so self-referential and inap? 
propriate" that it had minimal effect.19 A field observer 
in Pakistan?one of about 20 Americans in a 40-person, 
16-nation team organized by NDI?sensed that the real 
action was all at the edges of the team's peripheral vi? 
sion: He "left with a nagging feeling of unease... [over] 
what we did not see."20 Privately, field observers have 
complained that a statement congratulating the govern? 
ment on a successful election is often written in the home 
office before the field mission has made its evaluation 
(or even before all polling stations have reported results), 
rendering the exercise somewhat spurious. 
For governments being observed, then, the trick is to 
orchestrate the process enough to win, but not enough to 
arouse observers' suspicions. Poll-watchers like to see 
long, orderly lines of citizens, especially women. Outcomes 
are more credible if ruling parties yield at least some 
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seats to the peaceful opposition, and when posters, tele? 
vision coverage and rallies testify to a multi-party con? 
test in which the ruling party out-campaigned its rivals. 
Violence or wholesale manipulation while monitors are 
on hand will mar the experience, as occurred when OSCE 
and NDI observers refused to verify the reelection of 
Azerbaijan's president in October 1998, citing clear evi? 
dence of ballot-stuffing and fraud. Otherwise, it is a mat? 
ter of judging whether irregularities are of sufficient 
magnitude to invalidate the results.21 
In countries dependent on foreign financing, if the elec? 
tion goes well, it is an indication that electoral officials, 
party officers, candidates and campaigners have been 
well coached. Voting has been orderly, open to inspection 
and has followed a codified process. The victorious party 
deployed the sorts of campaign slogans, literature, ad? 
vertising and strategy that experts believe win elections. 
In this case, it can be concluded that the government 
has a "mandate." 
These messages are not lost on Arab voters. As in Cen? 
tral Europe, initial hopes that Westerner experts offered 
a political panacea have turned to incredulity, disappoint? 
ment and ultimately skepticism. Beyond the circle of 
English-speaking Egyptian development professionals in 
Cairo, many community and political activists are wary 
of foreign funders?period. Egyptian professionals, mean? 
while, may resent better-paid foreign experts who require 
translators to learn what they as local experts already 
know. Many voters would rather receive a couple of 
dollars than a delegation of international monitors. 
Disillusionment springs not from cultural or religious 
dispositions, but from raised and unmet democratic as? 
pirations.22 When elected parliaments pass laws slash? 
ing jobs, social security and public services while also 
raising or imposing fees for water, energy, medicines, food 
and other necessities, the act of voting is stripped of its 
policy relevance and participatory meaning. 
In conclusion, elections in the Middle East are not 
purely domestic phenomena, though we should not re? 
duce the entire exercise to a mere projection of Western 
neo-liberal hegemony. As assisted governments attempt 
to enhance their internal and external images, a 
transnational, post-Cold War liberal establishment ra? 
tionalizes and interprets chaotic politics through the lens 
of universal formulas. Election monitoring opens a po? 
litical system to scrutiny, placing national politics on 
worldwide exhibition. Monitoring enframes national poli? 
tics, representing to the outside world an appearance of 
order through constituency maps, diagrams of parlia? 
ment, legal appendices, executive summaries of progress 
and problems and accounts of structured interviews. 
Tutorials are translated down a hierarchy of expertise 
from Western capitals to English-speaking elites in Cairo 
or Almaty, to college students and educated rural people, 
to voters and poll-workers in the periphery, ultimately 
Continued on page 40. 
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Continued from Carapico, page 20. 
bringing representatives of the former to document the 
performance of the latter. Thus, although international 
monitors may help to make "first" elections peaceful and 
perhaps to keep sitting governments honest, there is also 
a risk that outsiders merely validate the claims of in? 
cumbent parties to a dubious democratic base. ? 
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